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I. INTRODUCTION

Firms can be an efficient way to organize production, as Ronald
Coase noted three-quarters of a century ago. 1 When things go awry,
however, society requires some way of resolving the troubles of distressed
businesses.2 Bankruptcy offers one such means, but it can be cumbersome,
costly, and over-attentive to the interests of certain parties, particularly when
company management can choose between liquidation and reorganization;3 it
is also a one-size-fits-all solution.4 Instead of going bankrupt, a distressed
firm could simply struggle along, dissipating productive assets until it falls
apart.
∗

Professor of Economics, Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057. Professor
Bourne wishes to thank James Bartholomew and James Baillie for their expertise, along with
Lauren Crane, the Hamline Law Review Managing Editor who oversaw editing of this article,
and each of the Hamline Law Review’s Associate Editors, as identified on the Volume 36,
Issue 3 Masthead.
1
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937).
2
Just over 5.7 million firms went out of business in the U.S. between 1999 and
2008, with over 95 percent of these being firms with fewer than 20 employees. See U.S.
SMALL BUS. ASS’N, Employer Firm Births and Deaths by Employment Size of Firm, 19892008, available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/dyn_us_tot_1.pdf. Of course, not all
firms that folded were distressed, but presumably many businesses closed their doors because
they were not as economically successful as their owners had anticipated.
3
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 1532 (2011) (federal bankruptcy statutes).
4
Bankruptcy clearly does not fit the needs of many firms that cease to exist:
only 6.2 percent of firm deaths in the period 1999-2008 occurred via bankruptcy. U.S. SMALL
BUS. ASS’N, supra note 2 (reporting the number of firm deaths between 1998 and 2008); see
generally U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/ Statistics/Bankruptcy
Statistics.aspx (reporting statistics on bankruptcy filings).

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

1

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 4

428

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

An attractive alternative for unwinding or turning around an
enterprise is receivership, an ancient remedy rooted in English chancery
law.5 I suggest that receivership can be the best way of preserving asset value
and treating parties fairly when businesses encounter problems. A greater use
of receivership can also create incentives for future parties to anticipate
contingencies, leading to efficient private resolution of problems rather than
costly legal proceedings. Yet receiverships have been underutilized, in part
because existing law concerning receivership provides little guidance to
either businesses or legal practitioners.
A Minnesota statute effective August 2012 offers a clear and
comprehensive set of rules regarding receivership. 6 This new law will
educate the legal and business community about an appealing alternative to
bankruptcy, promote an efficient and fair way of restructuring or liquidating
troubled companies, and encourage firms to foresee and address potential
problems in advance.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVE
When a business begins to have problems, its creditors naturally
worry about the safety of their investments. In the presence of transaction
costs and the absence of governing law, each individual creditor has an
incentive to rush to secure its interests, even if waiting and working together
would yield more overall. In a desperate race to get to assets ahead of rivals,
stakeholders in a firm would spend productive resources simply to gain title
to existing property. Bankruptcy law in theory provides a mechanism by
which creditors can avoid this free-for-all and, instead, act cooperatively.7
An effective bankruptcy regime would serve as a screening process,
preserving efficient businesses and eliminating firms whose resources could
be better used elsewhere. What is more, it would do these things in the leastcost fashion so as to economize on administrative costs.
Yet both theory and empirical evidence suggest that U.S. bankruptcy
law falls short on allocative efficiency grounds. 8 Most bankruptcies are
5

See generally RALPH E. CLARK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
RECEIVERS §§1-10 (1918), available at http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924020195834.
6
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 51 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 576.21 (2012)). Article 1 of the statute concerns receiverships; article 2
addresses assignments for the benefit of creditors (ABCs). An ABC is a procedure in which a
debtor voluntarily transfers all or substantially all of its property to a third party (the assignee)
who is responsible for liquidating the property and distributing the proceeds to the debtor’s
creditors. The assignee is functionally equivalent to a receiver.
7
See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9
BELL J. OF ECON. 437, 455 (1978); see also, e.g., Michelle J. White, Public Policy toward
Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules, 11 BELL J. ECON. 550, 551 (1980).
8
See Michelle J. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, 3 J. ECON. PERSP.
129, 129-30 (Spring 1989) (discussing the history of U.S. bankruptcy law); DAVID A. SKEEL,
DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001); Harvey Miller &
Shai Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed
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voluntary, meaning that the firm’s management remains in charge. 9
Management also has a choice of filing under either Chapter 7 (liquidation)
or Chapter 11 (re-organization) and, presumably, will choose the alternative
that serves its interests, which may not be the same as the interests of
society.10 Firms may thus opt for re-organization when society would benefit
from their dissolution; less often, firms might choose to liquidate even
though their assets are best deployed in the existing business.11 Michelle
White goes so far as to suggest that the U.S. bankruptcy system actually
delays the movement of resources to higher-value uses.12 Prominent among
the critics of Chapter 11 is Douglas Baird, who argues that, absent
transaction costs, investors might well have agreed beforehand to accept a
bankruptcy liquidation proceeding but would have been highly unlikely to
agree to a re-organization.13
Businesses for the 21st Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L. J. 153, 196 (2004); Harvey Miller & Shai
Waisman, Symposium, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt? 47 B. C. L. REV. 129 (2005-6). In the U.S.,
financial crises have tended to give rise to bankruptcy legislation; in early days, abatement of
the crisis typically yielded a repeal of the legislation. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (Ch. 19, 2
Stat. 19 (1800)) was repealed in 1803 (Ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803)), then the brief Panic of 1837
followed by a deeper crisis two years later generated the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 (Ch. 9, 5
Stat. 440 (1841)), which was repealed in 1843 (Ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843)). Another
bankruptcy act followed the Civil War in 1867 (Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867)); it was repealed
in 1878 after the Panic of 1873 was resolved (Ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (1878)). Following the
Panic of 1893, the U.S. finally passed legislation in 1898 (Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898)) that
remained in place. Since then, major revisions occurred with the Chandler Act of 1938 (Ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)), the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549), and the Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005)). See
also Jenny Bourne Wahl, He Broke the Bank, But Did Andrew Jackson Also Father The Fed?,
in CONGRESS AND THE EMERGENCE OF SECTIONALISM 188 (Paul Finkelman & Donald Kennon
eds., 2008) (discussing the financial upheavals of the 1830s).
9
Involuntary bankruptcy is rare. See, e.g., Richard C. Friedman, Involuntary
Bankruptcies – Part II - Ten Tips for Judges, Alleged Debtors, Assigness, Secured Creditors
and Trustees, 18(2) COM. L. BULL. 18 (2003); Edward M. Wolkowitz, Debtors Have New
Weapons Against Involuntary Bankruptcy, J. CORP. RENEWAL (Turnaround Management
Association, Chicago, IL), Dec.1, 2007, available at
http://www.turnaround.org/
Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=8503.
10
White, supra note 8, at 138.
11
The choice of Chapter 11 may simply delay the inevitable. Edward R.
Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small
Business Bankruptcies, 50 J. L. & ECON. 381, 392 tbl. 6 (2007) (showing that about 70 percent
of Chapter 11 cases are eventually dismissed or converted to Chapter 7). But some firms
choosing Chapter 7 may not be acting in a socially optimal fashion. Philippe Aghlon, Oliver
Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523, 525
(1992) (noting that, if bad fortunes are due to bad luck rather than bad management, the best
use of firm resources may be to continue operating).
12
White, supra note 8, at 130; Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a
Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 268, 291-93 (1994).
13
Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 (1986). See also Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 882 (1982). Baird’s critics
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Administrative inefficiency is also a concern. Bankruptcy
proceedings can involve substantial outlays of time and money.14 For small
firms in particular, the costs of bankruptcy proceedings may seem daunting.
And the detailed process required by bankruptcy statutes seems particularly
ill-designed for winding down small enterprises.15
Efficiency is not the only social issue that arises with troubled
businesses, of course; the equitable treatment of stakeholders matters as well.
However one might define “fairness,” the concept is not typically front and
center in a bankruptcy proceeding. Under Chapter 11, for example, a court
never has to determine whether a workout plan is “fair and equitable” unless
an entire class of unsecured creditors has voted against it.16 According to one
empirical study, the payoff to non-tax unsecured claims is zero in about 40
percent of Chapter 11 cases and less than 10 percent overall among filings by
small businesses. 17 Moreover, assets distributed or sold in a bankruptcy
proceeding can carry with them liability concerns that a creditor or
subsequent owner may not be well-equipped to handle. Although a
bankruptcy trustee is authorized to sell assets free and clear of liens in some
circumstances under 11 U.S.C. §363, a recent case heard in the Southern
District of New York permits some successor liability claims even after a
§363 sale.18
III. THE RECEIVERSHIP ALTERNATIVE
A receivership occurs when a court orders a receiver to take
involuntary possession of the property of someone else. Unlike a bankruptcy
trustee, a receiver serves as an officer of the appointing court.19 Generally
speaking, the receiver’s task is to preserve the value of the property and to

include Mille and Waisman, supra note 8, at 131, and Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W.
Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
14
Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7
Liquidation versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1281-82, 1287 (2006)
(estimating that bankruptcy consumes on average 10 percent of firm value, with the figure
being much greater for smaller firms), Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, The Success of
Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 619 (2009) (offering some
evidence that bankruptcy cases are resolved more quickly now than they were before).
15
See generally Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small
Business Workouts and State Law, 38 J.Legal Stud. 255 (2009).
16
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s
Ghost, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 393, 430 (1999).
17
Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small
Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study 22-23 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin.,Working Paper No. 0529, 2005).
18
Morgan Olson LLC v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 467 B.R.
694, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that trustee may only sell where there is notice and a
hearing, or trustee remains liable).
19
Clark, supra note 5, at 17.
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treat all interested parties fairly.20 Requests for the appointment of a receiver
can come from a creditor to a struggling company, from a shareholder, or
from within the company itself.21
Receivership proceedings arose in English chancery courts at least as
early as the 16th century; most U.S. states have crafted some legislation
regarding receivership.22 The heyday of receiverships occurred in the U.S.
during the latter half of the nineteenth century when railroad companies
began to encounter financial distress and to search for viable reorganization
schemes.23 With the codification of federal bankruptcy legislation, however,
receiverships became much less prominent,24 although they have remained in
use for collecting debts, liquidating companies, overcoming shareholder
deadlock, and coping with mismanagement or fraud.25

20
Clark, supra note 5, at 6, explains that receivership arose out of the practice of
granting injunctions to preserve property and avoid waste. Courts began to appoint receivers
in cases where doubt arose as to whether the person in possession of the property would
comply with the injunction. Examples include situations with remaindermen and infant
owners. Equitable remedies generally have their origins in courts of chancery; the principles
upon which chancellors were to base their decisions were “honesty, equity, and good
conscience.” Clark, supra note 5, at 5. A receiver is required to represent all parties with an
interest in the litigation. Weeks v. Cornwell, 106 N.Y. 626, 631 (1887); People v. Security Life
Ins. Co., 79 N.Y. 267, 270 (1879); Bull v. International Power Company, 86 N.J. Eq. 275, 278
(N.J. Ch. 1916).
21
The party seeking a receiver must have at least a colorable claim to the
property in question. Red River Potato v. Bernardy, 148 N.W. 449, 450 (Minn. 1914).
22
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §9.40.240 (West, Westlaw through legislation passed
during the 2012 2nd Regular Session and Third Special Session of the 27th Legislature); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §564 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.Sess. laws); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§291 (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws 2012); IOWA CODE §491.66 (West, Westlaw through
2012 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §14A:14-2 (West, Westlaw through L.2012, c. 78 and J.R.
No. 5); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2735.01-2735.06 (West, Westlaw through 2011 laws).
23
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 16, at 402-406 (discussing the history of
the use of equity receiverships to reorganize railroads); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate
Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 925-936 (2001); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 758-60 (2002); Stephen Lubben,
Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1420 (2003-4);
and Miller & Waisman, supra note 8, at 163.
24
In Delaware, for example, business bankruptcy filings from 2000 to 2009
totaled 8,760, whereas an “unscientific search on Westlaw for receivership decisions” counted
108 for the same period. Honorable J. Travis Laster, The Chancery Receivership: Alive and
Well, 28 DEL. LAW. 12, 15 (Fall 2010) (stating statistics on receiverships); see also AMERICAN
BANKRUPTCY INST., Annual U.S. Filings, http://www.abiworld.org/ AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Annual_U_S_Filings1&Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=6
2&ContentID=36294 (last visited Sept. 5, 2012) (collecting bankruptcy statistics for several
different time periods).
25
See, e.g., In re Petters, 401 B.R. 391, 399-400 (Bankr. D. Minn.) (regarding
liquidation); Randy G. Gullickson, Remedies in Shareholder Disputes: What Are We Fighting
For? 15 (2008), available at http://www.aoblaw.com/PDFs/Remedies.pdf (discussing Buetler
v. Dekker, Henn. Cty. File No. 05-2368, regarding shareholder deadlock); SEC v. Cook,
Litigation Release No. 21344, 97 SEC Docket 1768 (Dec. 18, 2009) (regarding
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By their very nature, then, receiverships are focused on allocative
efficiency (via their emphasis on asset preservation by a disinterested party)
and equity (due to the charge given receivers to represent all stakeholders).
Receiverships thus can avoid the filtering and principal/agent problems that
arise in bankruptcy when debtors remain in charge of assets and have the
choice to dissolve or to reorganize.
What is more, receivers may be much more well-suited than
bankruptcy trustees at maintaining enterprise value. Bankruptcy trustees
must be experts in the complexity of bankruptcy law, but receivers are often
persons who understand a particular industry and can operate a business in
that industry, or persons who can successfully evaluate and market the assets
of a firm. A property manager might be a typical choice for a receiver when
a single piece of real estate is involved, for example, whereas a CPA might
act as a receiver in a liquidation case.26
Despite the merits of receivership, one might question how well it
can work in large, complex, or multistate cases. And the flexibility and
stripped-down nature of administering a receivership via a unique court order
is potentially a double-edged sword: its simplicity is appealing but may lead
to duplication of effort . One attractive quality of detailed legislation is that
parties are well aware of the rules and do not have to re-invent the wheel
each time a new case arises. In addition, bankruptcy cases go through
specific courts staffed by judges trained in bankruptcy law, whereas any
judge can issue an order to establish a receivership.
Yet these are not insurmountable issues. Receiverships can be
federal, and state receivers can seek supplemental orders from judges in
other states. The exhaustive rules and processes laid out in bankruptcy
legislation may be irrelevant for many troubled businesses, particularly as
most firm “deaths” occur among small firms.27 Statutory guidance can make
receivership rules as clear as (though less cumbersome than) those governing
bankruptcy. And receivership orders are public; the more of them that are
issued, the more that businesses, judges, and lawyers will have templates to
consult.
mismanagement), and U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Cook, Civil No. 09-3332,
2011 WL 1363986, at *3-4 (D. Minn. Mar. 10, 2011) (regarding fraud).
26
When the Ivy Hotel in Minneapolis went into receivership, for example, the
Hennepin County District Court appointed real estate investment management company
Turnstone Group as the receiver. Mark Reilly, Ivy Hotel placed in receivership, MINNEAPOLIS
/ ST. PAUL BUSINESS JOURNAL (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.bizjournals.com
/twincities/stories/2009/08/10/daily48.html?page=all;.Susan Feyder, Economy’s latest travel
victim: Hotel Ivy, STAR TRIBUNE (Aug. 15, 2009), http://www.startribune.com/
business/53260752.html. Additionally, Lighthouse Management Group, headed by CPA
James Bartholomew, was appointed the receiver in a foreclosure case involving Lakeland
Construction Finance. Bank of Scotland v. Lakeland Construction Finance, No. 27-CV-0822657 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2008), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/ Documents/4/Public/
News/Orders/Order_Staying_Actions_in_Wisconsin_and_Order_Staying_Actions_in_South_
Carolina_Judge_Alton_5_26_09.pdf.
27
U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N, supra note 2.
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Perhaps most compelling, a greater use of receiverships could
encourage people to anticipate more contingencies in advance, thus
economizing on legal costs later on in the life of the business. Because the
request for receivership can come from any interested party, businesses will
have an incentive to plan ahead – more so than under a strict bankruptcy
regime which gives entrenched management considerable leeway over
decision-making during troubled times. If something does go amiss,
receivership can be a valuable tool for encouraging voluntary agreements
rather than drawn-out, court-involved remedies.28 As one commentator has
stated, “Even the filing of a motion for a receiver can often spur serious
settlement discussions and the resolution of disputes.”29
This last point raises an important issue: for administrative
efficiency’s sake, society wants parties to resolve potential problems in
advance when doing so is cheaper than relying upon the legal system
afterward. Having any legal mechanism in place to unwind a business could
encourage careless behavior and lack of planning, because private parties do
not bear the full cost of administering the legal system. I suggest, however,
that a better understanding and use of receiverships as an alternative to
bankruptcy could lead to lower administrative costs than our current system
generates.
IV. A NEW RECEIVERSHIP STATUTE FOR MINNESOTA
Although receivership is potentially a valuable means of coping with
troubled firms, it has been underutilized. What is more, receivership practice
has been confined to a narrow set of lawyers, and many judges have little
knowledge about how receiverships might work. This is partly because the
law governing receivership has been scattered and less than comprehensive.
In existing Minnesota statutes, for example, nearly 300 references to
receivership appear.30
Minnesota’s new Chapter 576 addresses both procedural and
substantive issues regarding receiverships so as to clarify and simplify the
law. It sets out detailed qualifications for receivers and requires the court to
verify in writing that the proposed receiver is qualified and independent.31
Receivers must give notice to all known interested parties, maintain records
and file reports with the court, and post a bond in an amount set by the

28

Peter A. Davidson, Wise Receivers, LOS ANGELES LAW., March 2008, at 24,
available at http://www.lacba.org/files/lal/vol31no1/2464.pdf.
29
Id.
30
James L. Baillie, Report on Behalf of the Receivership Statute Committee to
MSBA sections of Business Law and Real Property Law 1, 1 (2010).
31
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 56 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 576.26 (2012)).
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court. 32 Professionals retained by the receiver must file a notice with the
court but then may receive payment without prior court approval, although
the court may specify a process by which interested parties can object.33 The
court will also establish processes regarding claims and distributions.34 This
procedural streamlining will go a long way toward making receivership a
viable alternative to bankruptcy – or to floundering along and wasting
resources – when business enterprises run into problems.
Many of the substantive provisions of the new act will help conserve
asset value and enable markets to function more smoothly. Parties in
possession or control of receivership property will have to surrender it upon
the receiver’s demand and could be held in contempt of court if they fail to
do so, for instance.35 A receiver also succeeds to all of the rights and duties
of the respondent – that is, the person over whose property the receiver is
appointed – under any executory contract unless the court orders otherwise.36
In addition, the receiver can obtain unsecured credit and incur unsecured
debt without a court order. 37 In contrast to bankruptcy proceedings, then,
assets and firm activity will be in the hands of a disinterested party charged
with maintaining value rather than under the control of entrenched
management, which may have its own agenda.38 In certain circumstances the
court also will be able to order that a receiver’s sale of property is free and
clear of all liens, including redemption rights of the respondent.39 Productive
resources thus will more quickly re-enter the market than when possibly
encumbered property is distributed or sold by a bankruptcy trustee.
Under the new statute, unsecured stakeholders in a troubled business
have a better opportunity to recover than they would under a bankruptcy
proceeding. Although secured claimants have priority, distribution of
32

Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 58, 61-63 (codified as
amended at MINN STAT. §§ 576.27, 576.34-.36, and 576.38). Current law requires the posting
of a bond, although in practice this requirement is often waived. Baillie, supra note 30, at 6.
33
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 60 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. §576.32 (2012)).
34
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 60 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 576.33 (2012)).
35
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 64 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 576.40 (2012)). The receiver may also compel turnover by motion. Id.
36
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 67 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 576.45 (2012)).
37
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 66 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 576.44 (2012)).
38
The new law also improves upon existing receivership law in maintaining
value. A receiver for property in foreclosure will have discretion to pay expenses out of
property income in any order that will best preserve property value, for instance, rather than
following the strict order of priority specified in current law. Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143,
2012 Minn. Laws 54 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 576.25 (2012)).
39
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 67-68 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. § 576.46 (2012)). The receiver must demonstrate that the amount likely to be
realized by any person objecting to the receiver’s sale is equal to or greater than the objecting
person would realize within a reasonable time absent the sale. Id.
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remaining company assets will be made on a pro rata basis.40 This provision,
coupled with the general charge to receivers to treat all interested parties
fairly, suggests that equity as well as efficiency will be a greater concern in
receivership cases than it has been in bankruptcy proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
Healthy businesses are the lifeblood of the marketplace; keeping the
arteries of commerce clear requires an effective means of coping with sickly
or failing firms. Although society would like for businesses to anticipate and
prepare for contingencies, sometimes problems – a macroeconomic shock,
for example – are hard to foresee, or parties may have incomplete or
asymmetric information. We therefore need a body of law to help resolve
issues arising in troubled firms in an efficient and timely manner and to give
incentives to parties to anticipate these issues when doing so is cheap.
Equitable treatment of stakeholders in a distressed firm is likewise a social
concern.
Bankruptcy law offers one way of coping with ailing enterprises.
Yet, because it leaves many decisions in the hands of firm management,
current U.S. bankruptcy law sometimes resuscitates firms that are better left
to die and sometimes kills off enterprises that are only temporarily under the
weather. What is more, bankruptcies have often left many company
stakeholders with little or nothing to show for their investment.
Receivership provides an appealing alternative to bankruptcy. At its
heart, receivership can be both an efficient and an equitable remedy. Because
existing law governing receiverships is scattered and unfamiliar to many
practitioners and businesspersons, however, receiverships have been
underutilized as a means of working out troubled enterprises. The new
Minnesota statute offers a timely solution: its provisions will help promote
efficiency and fair treatment when firms encounter trouble, and its existence
will encourage businesses to anticipate potential problems and handle
existing ones promptly, leading to additional savings of social resources.

40
Act of March 30, 2012, ch. 143, 2012 Minn. Laws 69-70 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. § 576.51 (2012)).
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